e all have them: those hand-me-down systems bequeathed to us by our forebears, those old machines that have generated the lion's share of company revenues for the past decade -and that none of us want to touch for fear of being exiled to some program-maintenance hell.
RISK AND LEGACY
T h e enemy of all projects is risk: the probability of project failure. Risk may manifest itself as exceeded budgetary constraints or a failure to satisfy functional r e q u i r e m e n t s . Factors affecting tlie level of risk i ii c 1 CL d e d eve 1 opine 1 1 t -s t a ff c o nip eten cy, re qui rem en t s vo 1 a ti li ty , to o I capability, target-platform availahility, and the reliability of third-party software. Successful pro j ec ts re duce risks to manageable proportions.
Identifying and managing risks is part of the software project-planning process. However, when replacing a legacy system, software professionals often underestimate risk because they assume the legacy system is one of the organization's core coinpeteiicies and that it represents a set of stable requirements. This perception is true only if the replacement-project d eve 1 opine n t team uii d e r s t an d s the legacy system and uses it to reduce the risk associated with uncertain require in en ts . 0 the rwis e, s c h e dul e s developed under this assumption of design reuse are erroneous. Even if the legacy system's design is reused, it is unlikely that the original metliodology and tools will also be reused.
In 1989, when I worked a t Alcatel-SEL, one of our largest clients came to us with a problem: They were plaiining a niajor extension of their transit railway, which was already taxing the limits of their 1egacJ-system's host computer. Our initial estimates predicted that the cost of adapting the legacy sJ-stem to satisfy the client's lien requirements IT-as comparable to the cost of replacing the system. Tl'e were highll-motivated to push for a replacement for other reasons as well: It \vas becoming \-el? difficult to hire people who u-ere interested in maintaining a 20-year-old asseinblybased system, and we had a pent-up dislike of the tedious work the legacy system required.
Iii 1990 the decision TTYE made to replace the legacy system. Our mandate + resoli-e the performmce and inenioiy limitations by moving the system to a 32-bit hardware platform, + modernize the software by reorganizing the database and removing the operating restrictions impos:d h! -the old host's meinon-constraints.
+ improw de\-elopment-staff producti'ilty by using modern dedopment tools and high-level languages., and + use a development methodolop that complied n-ith relemnt snndards.
Our economic justification for this project -that the cost of replacing the legacy was comparable to the cost of adapting it -was the major constraint on tlie project.
\\as to
Out with the old. Our client's legacy system n-as an enhancemerit of one originall!-installed in 1971 to maximize the use of rail tunnels betn-een Switzerland and its neighboring COUIItries. T h e system is responsible for safely operating automatic trains on urban mass-transit railways. T h e system guides trains to a location on the guideway called a target point. As the target point is updated, the system leads the train to a new location, much like a carrot on a stick leads the donkey forward. This approach to railway signaling is known as the moving block.
There were several probkins with the old legacy system. + The host computer was a triplex of General Automation GA900s, which were becoming difficult to obtain and service. In addition, the system was being deployed to handle increasingly larger transit systems, and the number of trains the system could manage was limited by the host computer's processing capacity. Thus, the capacity of billion-dollar transit systems was limited by a few tens of thousands of dollars worth of old computer hardware.
+ IMeniory limitations imposed by
the host computer limited the information that could be stored about a train and the guideway; previous developers were thus forced to make assumptions about the behavior of trains to minimize data requirements. As a result, iinplenienting new features was often difficult, if not impossible.
+ Maintaining code was difficult because there were few programmers who had ever heard of -let alone programmed in -GA900 assembly language. T h e host also had a primitive development environment: just a sinple line editor, assembler, and linker.
+ After years o f evolutionary development and bug patches, much redundant code had accumulated in the system. For example, conditions were hard-coded rather than data-driven; if a change was made to a single condition to accommodate a new feature, an exhaustive search was required to find all conditions that made tlie same test.
T h e r e were also t h e inevitable smaller problems that afflict older, memory -li mi t e d re a 1 -ti me s ys t e ins.
For example, train names were numeric and based on the train's databaseindex key or the memory efficientbut cryptic -command language.
Staffing. T h e success of the legacy system was a major problem for our new project: W e were bidding on and winning contracts on the basis of the legacy system, and the delivery dates for these contracts were well ahead of that for the new system. The irnmedia- cy of these delivery requirements made it too risky to inove many experienced staff from the legacy system to the new system. W e thus had to form a new development team.
Although some people on the new project team were taken from the legacy system, most were hired externally. T h e r e were four senior engineers, three with strong software-development backgrounds and one who had been with the company for five years. The intermediate and junior engineers had varying levels of experience with real-time systems. All members of the new team had formal software-development training, but few had any training or backgrouiid in railway signaling. It was assumed that wc could learn what we needed to know about railway signaling from the legacy system. Organization and management. The project was managed using an incremental development model and was partitioned into 12 development stages according to function, the first four performed sequentially and the remaining performed in parallel. Development stages were assigned tn a development team or, in sinaller stages, to individual developers, all of whom employed the waterfall development method. Figure 1 shows the I 2 development stages.
T h e function a 1 require m en t s assigned to the first two development
stages were very simple. T h e first two ridiculously optimistic. Competent, stages were to act a5 pilot projects to capable people were making heroic test our new hardware platform and efforts to keep on schedule and were development tools. Only in the third missing the mark entirely In some stage would we start to add major hnc-cases, tasks that were esumated to take uonality such as moiiitoring trains. This eight hours took more than three was a good approach in theory and one months' that is recommended in CASE text-T h e principal legacy-system designbooks.' W e also thought it would be a ers made these estimates based on the good approach in practice because we effort needed for railway-signaling assumed that if we discovered problems experts to modify code with which they with the development process in stage 1 were intiniately familiar, using a or 5tage 2, we could take corrective methodology that was different from action before the process generated too the one employed on the new project. much momentum.
The estimates had little to do with the Unfortunately, as we were to learn time required for the new development later, stage 1 and 2 were not adequate team to create the new system T h e pilot projects for our new development estimates failed to take into account that methodology. W e ramped up the pro-+ most of the principal engineers of ject much too quickly between stage 2 the legacy system had a limited software and stage 3 Problems in our inethodol-background and were completely unfaogy that remained hidden were miliar with tlie requirements of the new stretched and cracked wide open by the devclopment methodology and tools, rapid ramp-up to stage 3 . Figure 2 and shows the relative staff efforts during + most of the new staff had a limited each project stage, effort increased by understanding of railway signaling more than an order of magnitude A designer's familiarity with the between stage 2 and stage 3.
application and the development took cannot be overlooked in the production of a project schedule Personnel capability and applicatlons experience are tuo of the most significant cost drivers in tlie Cocomo model. ' A new develop-D u r i n g o n e of the early design ment team unfamiliar with the applicastages, our first major problem tion domain can expend from three to emerged our effort estimates were 10 time5 more effort than a develop- 
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nient team experienced in the application domain. T o create a schedule that assumed the design team was familiar with the appkation was to ignore these cost drivers and therefore uiiderestiinate the schedule risk.
CAPTURE REQUIREMENTS (READ THE FINE CODE)
T h e most important output of the system analysis was a new data model that described the relationship between a train and the guideway elements. The original system's train and guideway data structures were designed to accommodate the meniory restrictions of the host computer and so were highly encoded and compact. This encoding made the addition of new features difficult at best -and in many cases impossible. Our new database unpacked the data and explicitly represented the relationships between data items ratheithan relying on the restrictive and iniplicit assumptions made by the code.
Ripple effect. Although these changes were necessary, their effect rippled throughout the entire system. The new data model made many of the legacy system's modules obsolete. Thus, a designer had to distinguish between actual train-management code and the coding "tricks" used to access the train data. This task became the software equivalent of separating the wheat from the chaff and effectively eliminated the possibility of a direct translation from Gh900 assembly to C. T h e focus of our design effort became the capture of the essential train-management algorithms. This led to our second major problem.
A significant number of design packages failed their design reviews because they had not properly captured all the functional requirements represented by the legacy code. _\lost designers were attempting to design their part of the system with only a partial s e t of requirements: the functional requirements for the ne\\-systeir and the design documentation for the legacy system. They n-ould rarely look a t the legacy system's code because they found the task of reading old assembly tedious. S a t u r a l l y the problem of human nature creeps in: If something is difficult, tedious, and slow-, n-e'll IS-]\. to avoid doing it. Cnfortunatelr, as with most legacy systems, there \\.as a wide gulf between the documented description of the system's functic'n and its actual function.
Harsh measures. 11-e chow a brutal solution: All staff were requirizd to read and comprehend the legacy 'code. M'e told them that it n-as an important part of their job to understand the code they were translating and their understanding would be reflected in their job -p e r fo rin ance r ex-i exv. W e took three steps to make reading the original system's code easier:
+ T h e principal engineer mapped the existing train data structiire in the legacy system to the new data model. This was one of the most useful design documents prepared during the project.
+ W e cobbled together a few Awk scripts to generate a cross-reference list of modules, function calls, and data structures. All macros were listed and commented. Although our CASE tool had a reverse-engineering component, it did not work for assembly codeand least of all GA900 assembly code.
+ Principal engineers started giving lunchtime seminars on the theory of railway signaling and the histoiy of the legacy system. W e even purchased a visual aid: a small electric train set to help us step through and understand the legacy code.
CONTROLLING CHANGE (JUST SAY NO)
A significant problem that often afflicts projects is that designers go beyond the scope of their mandate. In our project, the redesign of the train database gave some designers the impression that they were free t o redesign other parts of the system. However, although there were many features in the old system that were considered ugly, they were fundamental to the system's operation.
For example, several weeks were spent exploring how to create a new coordinate system for trains. T h e existing system employed two different coordinate systems: one for regular train movements and one for close-up operations such as coupling and uncoupling. The use of two different coordinate systems was one of the tricks that had been used to squeeze the legacy system into the host computer's limited memory. This trick really offended our computer-science sensibilities, and we proposed a new consistent coordinate system that would have been better froin a purist's point of view. However, this new coordinate system was a serious risk from a project point of view because we would be throwing away 20 years of operating experience to adopt something that we thought was conceptually better.
Uncoiitrolled change can increase project risk, especially in a legacyreplacement project. By changing exist-iiig system features, we were throwing away a working, accepted feature and replacing it with an untested feature that dramatically increased the risk to the project. Although new features are often much inore elegant and powerful, they are also much more complex and require more development time. New, complex features also have new, complex failure modes. We knew the shortcomings of the existing system, but we were now proposing to create a new mechanism whose operational behavior was uncertain.
Fortunately, the project manager put a stop to this improvement effort and set up an overriding project directive: No features of the legacy system were to be changed unless changing the feature reduced the cost of implementing the new system. This was probably the most iniportant decision rnade to insure the project's success. As a side effect of this decision, we were able to reuse all of the legacy system's existing test plans. T h e only additional test plans we had to write were the test plans for the enhancements we added to the new system.
CASE (A FOOL WITH A TOOL ... )
few had worked on Unix. Also, Unix machines were two to three times inore expensive than their P C counterparts, and personal productivity software for Unix -such as word processors and project-management tools -often cost 5 to 10 times more. At the tirne, however, PC technology was not what it is ' made semantic sense.
today; in retrospect, we might have been better off going with Unix and avoiding time lost in developing tools and patching around problem in the PC-network.
had a consistency checker that the development staff used to verify the data dictionary. What the staff failed to realize was that the tool coirld only verify the syntax and hierarchical derivation of data items. It could not verify if the contents of the data dictionary This problem was caught during an early review of the data dictionary by a developer who had CASE-tool experience. It took two developers more than a week to revise the data dictionarc.. and Overall, the CASE tool was invaluable in coordinating the designs of 15 individual developers and led to a higher-quality system. However, we experienced far more startup problems than we had anticipated.
i ,
another week for all developers t o revise their designs to use the new data dictionary. 'Io prevent a reoccurrence of this problem, an appendix was added to the development methodology describing how entries were to be defined in the data dictionarv. and a i , The experience factor. First, only two members of the development team had CASE experience and had used a design methodology such as Hatley/Pirbhai. W e almost naively believed that the transition to CASE meant little more than purchasing a product and sending the development team away for two weeks of training. T h e result was that many designers made all the classic errors of novice users in their early models. For example, the level of formality and detail specified in the mininaming convention was created.
Packaging problems. The third problem we encountered involved the procedure for extracting designs from the CASE database into review packages. A review package consisted of the structure charts for all modules included in the package, the mini-spec pseudocode for each module, the relevant portions of the data dictionary, functioiial-requirenients cross reference, and the package test plan. Preparation of the package specs-varied widely. It was coininon to An often unaccounted-for side effect see a statement of the form: Of a kgacy-system replacement project i f train i s invalid then call is the replacement of the legacy system's fai1-t r a i n . developrneiit methodology. T h e risks W i t h n o specification of what an acconipanying this side effect are often "invalid train" was in this context, how grossly underestimated or even ignored. could this statement he reviewed o r I n my opinion, most of the serious understood? Never did Frederick problems we encountered resulted from Brooks' words "be prepared to throw underestimating this risk and introduc-one away"' ring so true. Numerous iiig CASE tools.
early designs had to be discarded and redone -something we didn't account for in the schedule.
Tool selection. W e acquired Cadre's
Teamwork CASE tools for structured analysis and structured design. W e chose the Teamwork tools because they were the best available PC-based tools.
W e wanted to use PCs because most of our staff had PC experience while only a Checking consistency. During our early system specification, we encountered the second problem with our use of CASE tools: semantic inconsistencies in the data dictionary. T h e CASE tool was horrific and time-consuming. T h e interface between the CASE tool and the desktop publishing system required an average of four hours of manual effort to define the layout, export the data from the CASE system, then edit the package before it could be distributed. This problem became so bad that at one point four junior progrannners were spending all their time preparing packages for reviews.
W e pointed out this problem to our CASE vendor, who said that they had a wonderful new interfiace for extractinp the project or ex-en until the next project.4 CASE tool vendors make varying claims on the productii-itj-improvements that result from usinp their Clearly, we failed to adequately assess the risk of the new methodology and tools. There were no schedule adjustments made for the risk of the new tools: v tools. However, that higher productivity is only obtained after the designers become proficient x i t h the tool and the methodolog?. In the first project with a C.ASE tool? our experience colifirms the experiences of others: You should expect a t least a 30-percent decline in designer productivity on your first project.' documentation from the databaseone that wouldn't be available for their PC-based system for at least six months (translation, one year). I t was quite clear that the PC version of the CASE tool was the poor second cousin of its Uiiix counterpart.
W e eventually fixed the problem ourselves by hiring a junior programmer to write some Postscript filters and some "glue" code for generating our review-packages. T h e output of our home-brew system was less pretty, but we were able to reduce the effort required to produce a package by an order of magnitude.
getary targets.
ANALYSIS
Our project was successful in that it delivered the s!-stem ir-ith a very high level of sofixare quality, satisfied our customer, and \\-as reliably cut into operation. T h e most significant factor leading to this success n-as the project manager's emphasis on reducing or eliminating the risk associated with the introduction of new features and his keeping the design teams focused on the project's mandate. However, the software was delivered late and missed its initial budMany of our problems during system Managing CASE. A final problem with design were due to the development the CASE tools was that no one person staffs lack of familiarity with railway sigwas assigned the responsibility for man-naling and the existing system. M'e aging them. T h e result was t h a t a grossly underestimated this risk factor. senior designer with CASE experience T h e results mere ridiculously optimistic took it upon himself to be responsible schedules and design packages that failed for the tools. T h e problem, of course, reviews because they didn't compl!-with was that CASE-tool maintenance was the specifications represented bj-the not part of his job description and he legacycode. began to fall behind in his scheduled , However, the greatest problems were design work. Although much pressure ~ those encountered with the new develwas placed on him to catch up on his ' opment tools. T h e first two project design work, no relief was offered for stages were too small to reveal many the burden of maintaining the CASE problems and were inadequate pilots. It tools. T h e problem was not resolved wasn't until the third stage, which comuntil the designer quit, and a decision prised about 30 percent of the project, was made to hire a toolsmith.
that we truly began to see the problems W e should not have been surprised with tools and methodology. In many by these starhip problems. Shidies have cases, not only did a solution have to be shown that the benefits of CASE are designed, but we often had to go back not observed until the later stages of and rework existing modules. in fact, the schedule was compressed because it was assumed the development team would achieve productivity gains. Our experience with the development tools lends weight to the old saying, "Everything looks good until you know something about it."
LESSONS LEARNED
W h a t lessons did we learn? T h e si~cccss of the legacy system and the immediacy of our contracts made it too risky to transfer experienced staff from the legacy system to the replacem e n t project. W h i l e this decision reduced the legacy system's risk, it dramatically increased the risk on the replacement project. A compromise solution would have been to temnporarily relieve the engineering manager of his adniinistrative responsibilities and make him project architect so he could mentor new staff. Like many cngiiieering managers who are promoted from within, he had the most experience and knowledge regarding the legacy and the prohlein domain. Unfortunately, 75 percent of his time was taken up with adqiini stra tive pa sks. n general, software-development managers assume that reengiiieeri n g a legacy system is easier t h a n building a new system from scratch. W e tend to forget that in the case of a legacy replacement project, the only given is a set of formal requirements in the form of the existing system's code. T h e software still must be analyzed and understood by the dcvelopineiit staff, and a new design must be created, implemented, and tested. If the design methodology is changed, or if major requirements are added, the replacement project may take considerably longer.
If p a r t of your justification for replacing a legacy system is that the legacy system will reduce risk (by providing stable requirements, for example), make sure that you schedule a n analysis of the legacy system and that you ac t u d y use the legacy system's design New designers are not instantly going to understand the system just because you have the legacy code and documentation. Also, new designers may not examine "that old piece of crap" if not proddcd.
In addition, clarity of purpose must be maintained throughout the project. Everyone oil the project niust know U hy the decision to replace the legacy mas made and what the project ohjectives are Is this siniply an effort to port the system over to a new platform, or to d o a complete redesign7 T h i s is good advice for any project, but for a legacy systein it is even more important to ensure this because programmers' dislike of the existing system and a desire to " s t r u t t h e i r s t u f f ' can increase their impulse to go wild.
If part of the replacement process in c lud e s r e p 1 a c in g d eve 1 o p m e n t methodology, you should ensure that the project schedule accommodates the learning curve. Do not assuiiie that the addition of t h e new tools will reduce your developnient time; in fact, assume that it will take longer.
Whatever the reason, more often than not, the new replacement team collides with the egos of the original developers ("We caii show those old guys''). But replacement developers should always remember: T h e system built by those old g~iys works and has been tiringing in revenue for years. You are proposing to throw that cash cow into the tar pit of new systcrns development.
